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Abstract 
 
Through the sale of hydroelectric and water company shares, the building of dams to 
impound and control freshwater supplies, and via water trading schemes, there is 
continual acceleration in the privatization of water resources around the world. Key 
opponents to the enclosure of this ‘common good’ are indigenous communities who, 
having had their land and water appropriated by colonial societies, are now seeing these 
subjected to further economic colonization, exploitation and ecological degradation, 
often by transnational corporations with little or no local social or environmental 
accountability. Their protests about commercial appropriation are not merely attempts 
to assert prior rights of ownership and managerial responsibility. They are also a critique 
of ideologies oriented towards unlimited growth and development which, they argue, 
conflict with their more sustainable and reciprocal relations with place, and with the 
non-human environment.  
 This paper considers some of the efforts of indigenous people to uphold their 
traditional rights to own and manage water. It focuses particularly on a recent case 
brought by the Māori Council against the Crown in New Zealand/ Aotearoa. Taking this 
to the Waitangi Tribunal, to the High Court and finally to the Supreme Court, Māori tried 
to prevent the Government from privatizing a major hydro-electric company and thus its 
water allocations. As well as initiating a lively national discussion about water ownership 
and governance, the case articulated a bi-cultural dialogue which resonates with wider 
national and international debates about human-environmental relationships and what 
constitutes ‘the common good’.  
 
Introduction 
 
Fig. 1. ‘Right to Water’ poster, Mexico City. 
 
Historically, water has been widely regarded as a ‘common good’, either under the aegis 
of the state or within the localized common property regimes of indigenous societies.1 
This status recognizes its literal essentiality to human health and well-being, and its 
centrality to all economic and social practices, as well as the material difficulty of 
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containing it with sufficient certainty to enable the imposition of exclusive property 
rights. Framed as a property right, the notion of a ‘common good’ defines public rights 
of access to and use of material resources. However, this conventional legal frame tends 
to obscure its moral foundation: that it constitutes a social contract to uphold collective 
societal well-being. Along with other researchers critical of the anthropocentricity that 
characterizes many human-environmental engagements,2 I would argue that the 
concept of a ‘common good’ can also be extended to debates about bioethics, having 
the potential to encompass the interdependence of humans, non-humans and 
ecosystems, and an understanding that sustainability is reliant upon reciprocal relations 
– ie. a social contract – between them.3 This more egalitarian bioethical position draws 
inspiration from some of the indigenous worldviews noted in this article, in which the 
non-human is seen to have agency and power, and thus to occupy a collaborative 
position in relation to human societies. In the colonial appropriation of indigenous land 
and resources, such subaltern worldviews have been subsumed but, as the events 
described below illustrate, they resurface in debates about the ownership and 
management of water.  
 
Still, in the mainstream, a utilitarian, human-centred view of the material world has 
prevailed. Over the last several centuries, and in the last three decades in particular, 
new material and legal technologies and the dominance of neo-liberal ideologies have 
continued to widen disparities in power between humans, and between humans and 
other species. Water has been increasingly commodified, privatized and controlled by 
elite groups and, more recently, by transnational corporations. While privatization has 
been promoted in the political arena as a route towards more ‘efficient’ water use, in 
reality it has tended to go hand-in-hand with intensified use of land and resources and – 
particularly with the transferal of control to non-local organizations – disregard for the 
local social and ecological impacts of exploitative practices. 
 
Fig. 2. Wivenhoe Reservoir, Queensland, Australia. 
 
Many indigenous peoples, already dispossessed of their customary relationships with 
water, have observed these effects with deep concern. Anxious to regain not only 
former rights but also managerial responsibilities that express more sustainable 
environmental values, they are some of the most committed opponents of efforts to 
transform water from a common good into private and purely economic assets. 
Interdisciplinary collaborations between indigenous communities, anthropologists and 
legal experts have also highlighted the connections between current conflicts over 
water and wider debates about the bioethics and sustainability of contemporary water 
use and management.  
 
In Australia and New Zealand, for instance, such collaboration has generated ways to 
translate the different tenets of indigenous Law into European style legislation 
comprehensible to all parties. In the course of such knowledge exchange, national laws 
have expanded to accommodate explicit notions of long-term affective attachments to 
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place; the ways that social and cultural identity are encoded in material environments; 
ideas about living water and spiritual connections.4 This has supported the development 
of broader legislation, for example, valorizing diverse cultural heritages and the 
protection of environments and non-human species. Debates within the legal arena 
have also enabled indigenous groups to offer a critique of introduced forms of land and 
resource management, highlighting the transitions through which their more reciprocal 
relations with other species and ecosystems have been overridden by unsustainable 
modes of environmental engagement prioritizing human needs and giving primacy to 
human agency and direction.  
 
Water Power and Material Democracy 
 
Within the wider frame of theories about property,5,6,7 explorations of the relationship 
between water and political power8,9 and more recent analyses of water privatization,10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15 have made it clear that the ownership and governance of water is directly 
expressive of social and political relations. No form of production is feasible without 
water, and control of the generative ‘stuff of life’ is fundamentally empowering.16 The 
loss of such control is commensurately disenfranchising, and every colonial invasion has 
thus prioritized the seizure of water sources. Early Roman imperialism not only 
introduced new infrastructures for controlling and directing water but also established 
the foundations of a legal framework for individuated and more alienable forms of 
property rights.17 In the Christianization of Europe, water sources were appropriated 
and ‘converted’, and powerful abbeys and monasteries controlled and disbursed water 
supplies.18 The establishment of colonial empires by European nations has invariably 
entailed the appropriation of reliable water sources, for example by the graziers who 
settled Australia.19   
 
Despite falling under new regimes of governance, water’s status as a common good 
persisted until the last century, in which it became subject, in industrialised societies, to 
an increasingly intensive tug-of-war. Managerial control shifted between 
public/municipal agencies and private water supply companies in concert with changing 
political climates, as governments committed to promoting equality and collectivity 
alternated with those adhering to market-oriented ideologies.   
 
In the late 1900s, the extreme right-wing policies that emerged in the UK, coupled with 
new physical and legal technologies for establishing property rights in water, enabled 
the Thatcher government to initiate a major international trend towards water 
privatization. This has taken various forms: despite major protests, the water industry in 
England and Wales was privatized in 1989, and over 40% of supply companies are now 
partly or wholly owned by transnational corporations. For example, Northumbrian 
water is now owned by Cheung Kong Holdings in Hong Kong; Thames Water by the 
Australian Macquarie Group; Bristol water by the Canadian company, Capstone. In each 
decade since privatization, customers’ water bills have risen by approximately double 
the rate of inflation, at an average of over 60%, and in the last decade by up to 82%. 
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Companies in public ownership (Scottish Water and the – re-organised into a not-for-
profit company – Welsh company Glas Cymru) have during the same period been able 
to freeze water prices or impose much smaller rises. In 2013, a 3.5% average bill rise in 
England generated particular outrage when Corporate Watch pointed out that six of the 
major private water companies had also avoided paying millions of pounds of UK tax. 
 
In Australia, water trading schemes have effectively transformed state water allocations 
into private assets, and there has been a similarly rapid accumulation of these by foreign 
corporations. An example is provided by the notorious Cubbie Station, which owns 28 
miles of dams along the Culgoa River and diverts into these a quarter of the water that 
would otherwise flow into the Darling River and so into the desperately degraded 
Murray-Darling Basin. Having accumulated over 50 water licenses, the station recently 
sold 80% of its shares to a Chinese consortium. In New Zealand/Aotearoa, as well as 
proposing new water trading schemes, John Key’s Government focused on plans to sell 
off shares in publicly owned hydro-electricity companies (and thus their vast water 
allocations).   
 
While major profits have been made by those able to buy tradable allocations or shares, 
and by the directors of the companies concerned, there are several areas of cost to 
consider. One is to the wider populations of these countries, whose previously 
inalienable common ownership of water has, at least in de facto terms, been handed to 
a privileged minority. Recognition that the material control of essential resources is 
intimately connected to political and social power raises important questions for 
societies, not only about who owns the water, but about who really owns the State.7 
Clearly there are long-term implications in transferring the ownership of such a vital 
resource to an elite network of highly mobile individuals and transnational corporations.  
 
Another set of costs is to the human and non-human inhabitants of the waterways and 
catchment areas subject to the decisions of absent water owners whose aims are largely 
commercial. Such investors’ concern for the well-being of local communities and 
ecosystems rarely rises above – and frequently falls below – the minimum duty of care 
defined by legislation and (in theory) enforced by notoriously weak regulatory bodies. 
This underlines the point that the ownership and control of water is not merely 
indicative of social and political arrangements between humans, but also reflects the 
ideas, values and practices that construct each society’s mode of engagement with the 
material environment, its non-human inhabitants and its ecosystemic processes. It 
offers, in other words, a distinct profile of a particular bioethical position.  
 
Fig. 3. Alma Wason, fishing in the Mitchell River, north Queensland, Australia. 
 
A third major area of cost is to the minority indigenous populations in settler societies, 
whose customary forms of land and water ownership, and thus their capacities for 
political and economic participation, have been appropriated first by the Crown and, 
further, by processes of privatization. This dispossession and disenfranchisement has 
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not only had devastating social, economic and political effects on these communities, it 
has also prevented them from enacting their own bioethical values. It is important not 
to romanticize these: even the most subtle engagements, for instance those of 
Australian hunter-gatherers, have had significant long-term environmental effects, for 
example in opening up the landscape and encouraging fire-reliant plant species, and in 
hastening the demise of mega-fauna. In New Zealand/Aotearoa, Māori cleared major 
areas of forest to establish a horticultural economy prior to European settlement; in 
some Pacific Islands even low-key forms of production proved unsustainable.20  
 
However, it is fair to say that small-scale ‘place-based’ societies, whose relationships 
with specific areas are intimate, long-term and based on collective forms of ownership, 
have generally given strong priority to sustainable practices. With worldviews in which 
land and waterscapes and their non-human inhabitants are seen as sentient partners 
with whom human societies must negotiate on equal terms, their traditional bioethical 
positions – and their views on water management – are radically different from those of 
the societies in which they are now minorities.  
 
Fig. 4. Nelson Brumby, one of the first Aboriginal Rangers in the community of 
Kowanyama, north Queensland.  
 
Conflicts over water are therefore concerned not only with property rights, but also with 
managerial responsibilities and deeply felt affective concerns about human-
environmental relations. It is these fundamental differences that form the basis of 
contemporary indigenous claims to water. Their common factors may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 Individual and collective identity is based on shared substantial connections 
to specific ancestral beings or deities, places and the waters of those places.  
 Collective rights of water ownership and use are based on this connection.  
 There is no place, in these cosmological schemes, for the alienation of people 
from their land and resources.  
 Human well-being and environmental well-being are connected, and 
disturbance of the environment, such as the impediment of proper water 
flows, is understood to have social, ecological and spiritual impacts.Reference 21, 
p 8. 
 
Water Resistance 
 
Indigenous communities have many shared experiences of colonization: exploratory 
contacts that were often alarming and disturbing; periods of cross-cultural negotiation 
and collaboration; more extreme and violent colonization and dispossession; and 
decades of paternalistic domination and marginalization which included the imposition 
of new languages, religions, social and economic practices. In a purportedly post-
colonial period – or a period characterized by economic rather than direct colonization – 
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indigenous rights and values began to be re-established with the advent of the civil 
rights and land rights movements in the 1960-70s. These encouraged significant legal 
developments internationally: the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries;22 the Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples;23 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;24 and the Declaration 
on the Right of Development.25  
 
Nationally, indigenous rights to water are embedded in more complex social, political 
and legal arrangements. In Australia, for instance, it took 200 years for the Federal 
Government to acknowledge, partially via the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern 
Territories) and more fully in the 1993 Native Title Act, that Aboriginal people had their 
own systems of land ownership prior to European settlement. The Native Title Act was 
sufficiently radical to bring down the Keating government, and in the lengthy period of 
right-wing governance that followed, the efficacy of the legislation was greatly reduced. 
Still there have been occasional successes, including several cases in which some rights 
to water have been regained. For example, the Lardil people of Croker Island near 
Darwin were able to establish some non-exclusive rights to the foreshore fishing zone 
through the Australian High Court in 2001 (Yarmirr v Commonwealth 2001). But courts 
have tended to apply very narrow definitions to such rights, limiting native title to non-
exclusive, non-commercial uses. The Blue Mud Bay decision in 2008 went a little further: 
though still focusing on customary usages, the Australian High Court ruled that the 
Arnhem Land Indigenous Land Trust (representing the Yolngu people) should have 
exclusive ownership of waters to the low tide mark, including the tidal areas of rivers 
and estuaries.26 
 
Notably, both cases related to sea water. With water trading schemes, other forms of 
privatization and massively intensified competition, regaining indigenous rights in 
freshwater has proved more elusive. Altman and Cochrane observe that although the 
Australian Native Title legislation made some provision for the acknowledgement of sea 
rights, it also confirmed Government ownership of freshwater and minerals.27 
Nevertheless, the legal battles have achieved some gains in demonstrating indigenous 
interests in freshwater and tying these to legislative efforts to protect cultural rights 
relating to water use and management. They have fed, for example, into Indigenous 
Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) which provide a cheaper, more achievable alternative to 
Native Title claims which can cost over $15 million AUD and take a decade to conclude. 
They have also influenced the recommendations of the National Water Commission, 
requiring the inclusion of indigenous communities in water planning processes, and 
demanding that the water plans required from commercial users should incorporate 
indigenous issues such as customary use, spiritual and social objectives. As this implies 
though, these developments have confined both land and water rights to ‘traditional’ 
subsistence usages that pertained in the pre-settlement period. And while reinstituting 
some rights in resources, the Native Title process has failed to account for the effects of 
increasing freshwater abstraction on these: for example, the degradation of major 
wetland areas on which customary economic practices depend.21  
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Canada offers some useful parallels. The Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 gave the 
Canadian Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over ‘Indians, and Land reserved for the 
Indians’. 115 years later, the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 signaled some real 
change in stating that ‘The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples 
of Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed’ and promising ‘a restructuring of power 
and responsibility with regard to natural resources’ (1982: Section 35). Legal debates 
(eg. Sparrow v R 1986) have reestablished native Canadians’ fishing rights,28 and 
although, like Australia, Canada has tended to limit such rights to ‘traditional’ practices, 
it has been robust in supporting co-management agreements. With a focus on provincial 
rather than federal negotiations, such agreements range from tokenistic arrangements 
to those in which indigenous peoples have asserted quite significant levels of 
sovereignty with ‘a fundamental rethinking of rights and relationships’. Reference 29, p 207.  
 
Despite achieving some recognition of their rights, however, First Nation groups in many 
parts of Canada continue to experience problems that mirror those of indigenous 
communities elsewhere: poor access to safe drinking water; exclusion from decision-
making and, above all, continually expanding demands on freshwater from powerful 
interest groups involved in hydropower, oil and gas extraction, and other forms of 
mining, many of which have significant ecological and social impacts.30 The ‘Idle No 
More’ First Nations protest movement, which has campaigned for the last thirty years, 
was recently revitalized to oppose the efforts of a right-wing Federal Government to 
reduce the legislation protecting the rights of indigenous people and those of the 
environment. The First Nations were particularly concerned that Bill C-45 (2012), in 
revising the Navigable Waters Protection Act (1882), would remove existing 
requirements for indigenous consultation and approval of construction in or around 
navigable waterways:  
 
By releasing private companies from the duty to notify the federal government when 
undertaking infrastructure projects, the new act in turn takes away the federal 
government's duty to consult with First Nations before approving new projects such 
as the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline.Reference 31, p 1. 
 
Annita McPhee, head of the Tahltan First Nation council described this as ‘a direct 
attempt to undermine the protection of those lakes and waters and to allow access for 
developers’.Reference 31, p 1. Idle No More’s current campaign asks all Canadians to join in a 
‘peaceful revolution’ against what the organization regards as exploitative 
developments, for example of the Athabasca Tar Sands:  
 
Our people and our mother earth can no longer afford to be economic hostages in 
the race to industrialise our homelands. It is time for our people to rise up and take 
back our role as caretakers and stewards of the land. (Eriel Deranger, Athabasca 
Chipewyan First Nations)32   
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Idle No More’s own vision statement encapsulates the bioethically inclusive nature of 
human-environmental relations that such ‘caretaking’ and ‘stewardship’ promotes:  
 
The Vision [...] revolves around Indigenous Ways of Knowing rooted in Indigenous 
Sovereignty to protect water, air, land and all creation [my emphasis] for future 
generations.Reference 31, p 1. See also 33.  
 
The Taniwha and the Crown 
 
In New Zealand/Aotearoa, Māori have also been quite successful in negotiating co-
managerial roles, for example, in the signing of an equal co-management agreement for 
the Waikato River in 2009.34 Their negotiating position is strengthened by having 
substantial tribes (iwis) rather than widely scattered clans, and by the reality that they 
have always composed a sizeable percentage of the population currently estimated at 
14.6% of the whole, 35 compared to the 2.5% represented by Aboriginal people in 
Australia.36 
 
Their most critical tool for negotiation has been the Treaty of Waitangi (te Tiriti o 
Waitangi) (1840) which acknowledged their ownership of land and resources at a 
foundational stage in the nation’s history. Although much Māori land was bought – 
often through coercive practices – by Europeans, and the Treaty is less explicit about 
water rights, it established clearly that Māori were land and resource owners, and 
provided the basis for a bi-cultural society. Conceding that Māori had some customary 
rights in water, the Crown has argued that these are accommodated in the Resource 
Management Act (1991), which provides ‘substantial recognition of Māori interests’ and 
a 35 year limitation on the term for water permits.Reference 37 paras 135, 136. More recently, 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Bill English, summarized the Crown position as 
acknowledging that Māori have ‘rights and interests in water and geothermal 
resources’. He suggested that these are being addressed through an ‘ongoing Waitangi 
Tribunal Inquiry’ and a number of ‘parallel mechanisms’.38  
 
As in Australia and Canada though, ‘rights and interests’ in water are carefully 
distinguished from ‘ownership’. The New Zealand government, like those in other 
settler societies, has resisted signing international legislation aimed at reinstituting 
indigenous rights more fully. Still, these agreements form the basis for discussions. The 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stresses the 
importance of sacred sites, and social and spiritual issues often take center stage. This is 
partly because these are less legally and politically contentious than economic rights, 
but also because affective relations to places and sentient beings are central to 
indigenous environmental relationships, and, as noted above, form the basis for their 
claims.  
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In New Zealand/Aotearoa, a Māori bioethic of partnership with the non-human is well 
expressed in descriptions of the taniwhas that are believed to inhabit key water places. 
A taniwha is:  
 
…a living being whose spirit remains present at the spring and at specific places 
along the stream.... The taniwha is a generative ‘life essence’ of people and 
places… encapsulating ideas about shared substance and social connections 
between people and places. The well-being of the taniwha is connected to the 
well-being of the people… and harm to the taniwha or its home is believed to have 
an impact on [their] health and well-being.Reference 21, p 4 
 
Fig. 5. Taniwha, Rotorua Court House. 
 
In ‘living water’, which has its own life force or mauri, resources are seen as the gift of 
the river, rather than as commodities. The ritual performance of special karakia is 
necessary in anticipation of these gifts, and to thank the river when they are received.  
Parts of the river and land are not separable from each other or from the human 
communities that they connect, and this sense of linkage is demonstrated in the term 
that local iwis used traditionally to describe the Waikato River, Tupuna Awa, which 
defined it as ‘an important tribal ancestor’. Reference 34, p ii. Springs (puna wai) have 
particularly strong relations with whanau [extended kin groups]: 
 
The water from the puna wai [water of the spring] of a whanau is considered a 
taonga to that whanau as it carries the Mauri [life force] of that particular 
whanau… In essence then the very spiritual being of every whanau is part of the 
river... In this sense the river is more than a taonga[;] it is the people themselves. 
Reference 39, Section 2.4. 
 
The concept of taonga is important. It has been defined as ‘treasure’ and on more than 
one occasion the Waitangi Tribunal, set up in 1975 to hear claims brought in relation to 
the Treaty, has ruled that rivers are taonga. Critically, such treasures can be passed from 
one generation to the next – a key definition of ownership. As the late Ariel Aranui of 
Ngāti Pahauwera put it 
 
To the Māori water is the essential ingredient of life, a priceless treasure left by 
ancestors for the life sustaining use of their descendants. The descendants are in 
turn, charged with a major kaitiaki (stewardship) duty, to ensure that these 
treasures are passed on in as good a state or indeed, better, to those following. 
Reference 40, Section 2.2. 
 
Taniwhas, as river guardians, are said to become angry when developments take place 
along rivers without the permission of local Māori. In 2011, for example, the taniwha 
inhabiting a river that runs underground through Auckland was said to be disturbed by 
plans for a city metro system. Thus taniwhas, like other indigenous water beings around 
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the world, are brought into play in the political arena to both demonstrate and make 
the case for indigenous environmental values, and for their rights to enact these 
through ownership and management.41,42 
 
There have been long-running debates in New Zealand about whether traditional Māori 
ownership of land and resources encompassed freshwater. Co-management 
agreements with the Crown have taken varying forms, and there is clear understanding 
that the control of water represents political power:  
 
The Waikato River lies at the heart of tribal identity and chiefly power and has 
therefore become a key focus of ongoing local struggles for prestige and mana 
among Waikato Māori.Reference 34, p i. 
 
The restitution of indigenous sea rights, as across the Tasman, has proved to be more 
achievable. There was a major Māori claim aimed at regaining control of the foreshore 
in the early 2000s which the government resisted by introducing the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act (2004). Interestingly, the Crown’s argument against Māori claims, that the 
foreshore had to remain publicly accessible to all New Zealanders, also served as some 
defense against major commercial privatizations and exclusion along the seashore, thus 
preserving another form of ‘common good’.  
 
Fig. 6. Sea taniwha or marikihau, carving on Moana Marae, Auckland.  
 
John Key’s right-wing government, brought into power via coalition with the Māori Party 
in 2008, repealed the 2004 Act with their help in 2011. Its replacement, the Marine and 
Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act (2011), gave Māori some customary rights in relation 
to parts of the coastline. But because opposition to this move focused on fears that 
increased Māori rights would exclude others, this act also protected public access, 
underlining the communal ownership of the public marine and coastal area. Thus the 
clauses intended to limit Māori rights continued to frame access to the shoreline as a 
common good. With some exclusion for retaining Crown control over national parks and 
conservation areas, the Act states that: 
 
Neither the Crown nor any other person owns, or is capable of owning, the 
common marine and coastal area.Reference 43. Clause 11.2. 
 
A similar argument has recurred in relation to freshwater throughout a series of Māori 
efforts to re-establish rights in rivers and lakes. Freshwater, the government has 
maintained, is a public good. It either belongs to all, or simply cannot be owned. 
However, having embraced Thatcherism warmly, governments in New Zealand, as 
elsewhere, have tended to fund pre-election tax cuts by selling off state owned 
‘enterprises’. In 2011 John Key’s government turned its attention to major hydro-
electricity generators with extensive water allocations, including Mighty River Power, 
Solid Energy, Meridian Energy and Genesis Energy. It proposed transforming Mighty 
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River Power into a ‘mixed ownership model company’ with sales of 49% of its shares, in 
effect ceding, if not a controlling interest, at least significant control of water to private 
shareholders, and paving the way to further such sales. With low public engagement in 
political debates, there was little opposition until the New Zealand Māori Council and 
other Māori organisations raised a major challenge, arguing that such a move by the 
Crown was inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.1 This highlighted 
efforts by Māori to assert, in accord with their own interpretation of the Treaty, that 
they have proprietary rights over freshwater.  
 
There is no space here to unpack the multiple legal and cultural complexities of this 
case, but in making its way through the legal system it followed a predictable course. 
The Waitangi Tribunal recommended delaying the sale of Mighty River Power shares 
until negotiations between the Crown and Māori could be completed, and noted that: 
 
Our generic finding is that Māori had rights and interests in their water bodies for 
which the closest English equivalent in 1840 was ownership rights, and that such 
right were confirmed, guaranteed, and protected by the Treaty of Waitangi, save 
to the extent that there was an expectation in the Treaty that the waters would be 
shared with the incoming settlers.Reference 44, p 110 
 
The Government remained determined to proceed with the sell-off in the first quarter 
of 2013.  
 
The Crown accepts that Māori have legitimate rights and interests in water but 
asserts no one owns water and therefore the best way forward is not to develop a 
framework for Māori proprietary rights but to strengthen the role and authority of 
Māori in resource management processes.Reference 45. Electronic resource.  
 
The case went to the High Court in October 2012, by then raising considerable national 
debate. This articulated a mixture of concern about the sale of public assets in general, 
and anxiety about Māori claims and their potentially exclusive outcomes. For many non-
Māori New Zealanders, the status of water as a common good was threatened by any 
form of enclosure, whether by private shareholders or by Māori, highlighting a difficult 
point of tension for indigenous communities hoping that sympathetic sectors of 
majority populations will support their claims. With this in mind, Māori representatives 
offered reassurance that their customary views of water ownership are not exclusive. 
Observing that in moving towards asset sales the government had not addressed the 
issue of Māori rights in water, the Honourable Sir Edward Taihakurei Durie, former High 
Court Justice and Chair of the Waitangi Tribunal, and now co-Chair of the Māori Council, 
commented on Marae TVNZ that: 
                                                        
1 I note that I assisted the Māori Council in the preparation of their case.14 I also acted as an expert witness in 
responding to queries from the Waitangi Tribunal and to cross-examination by the Crown Counsel. This work built on 
earlier research and an advisory document (co-authored with Mark Busse) for Maori iwis.
21 
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This is not a claim to the ownership of all water… This is a claim to proprietary 
interests.... We are looking at particular areas and what we need to do is define 
how far it can and should go so that it doesn't intrude on the general public 
interests… The ultimate goal in all of this is to get recognition – it is very much a 
cultural issue.46 
 
However, Māori concepts of proprietary rights do not readily fit the concepts of 
‘ownership’ contained in the (essentially Roman) property law prevailing in most 
industrialized societies. Nor do they accommodate a wider reality that water ownership, 
despite governments’ arguments that privatization is confined to ‘allocations’ or ‘supply 
companies’ and does not entail selling the water itself, have become a significant source 
of anger and resentment to populations well acquainted with the adage that ‘possession 
is nine-tenths of the law’.  
 
In the event, the High Court supported the Crown’s case, ruling that the law being 
employed to effect the proposed sale of assets ‘is achieved by primary legislation which 
cannot be questioned for compliance with the principles of the Treaty in the courts’, and 
that in any case, the sale of 49% of the company’s shares ‘would not materially 
prejudice Māori claims and interests in the water’.47  
 
The Māori Council’s appeal then went directly the Supreme Court, ‘at the request of the 
Crown to meet the time constraints it has in finalising the IPO and realising up to 49 per 
cent of the value of Mighty River Power for important government purposes’.Reference 48, 
Introduction p 5. The Supreme Court made some concession to Māori interests, noting that 
the decision to transfer Mighty River Power (and other state owned enterprises) into a 
‘mixed-ownership’ regime, and any subsequent sales of shares in mixed ownership 
companies, should remain subject to an obligation to act consistently with the principles 
of the Treaty. But it supported the Crown’s aims and dismissed the Māori appeal, 
concluding that although Crown ownership and control of the power-generating 
companies ‘will undoubtedly be diminished’, and that privatization might ‘preclude or 
limit the possibility of some options for redress which would otherwise be 
possible’,Reference 48, p 135 the sale would ‘not impair to a material extent the Crown's 
ability to remedy any Treaty breach in respect of Māori interest in the [Waikato] river’. 
Reference 48, p 7 Such remedies have, in the past, focused on compensation, and the case 
therefore generated accusations in the New Zealand media, from right-wing politicians 
and members of the public, that this was in fact the major purpose of Māori claims in 
relation to water.  
 
This is a long-running argument, and will doubtless continue. It would be naïve to 
suppose, after centuries of ‘assimilation’, that contemporary indigenous peoples around 
the world retain a wholly pre-colonial view of their relationships with water, or to 
suggest that they should. Nor are their views homogenous. But despite the political 
noise, Māori concern is for more than direct economic ownership or financial redress. 
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Underpinning their efforts is an ongoing commitment to values and ways of living that 
support close connections between people and places, and to practices that are 
sustainable and respectful of the needs of non-human species and environments. Such 
relationships are plainly at odds with a narrow view of water as a purely economic 
resource, and resonate more closely with the notion of water as a common good. 
Ironically, though, it seems that the only way to be able to promote such values is to 
regain some degree of control over water.  
 
Groundswell 
 
As resource use intensifies and climate change adds further pressures, rising 
competition for freshwater around the world will result in the loss of legal and material 
control of water for many groups, not just indigenous communities. Large dam schemes 
are dispossessing millions around the world; powerful irrigation companies are diverting 
water away from smaller farmers; transboundary rivers are becoming intense sources of 
conflict. As noted at the outset, majority populations are being disenfranchised as 
governments sell publicly owned water to private elites, simultaneously dissolving their 
own capacities to uphold the common good. Thus the water that formerly connected 
communities is increasingly dividing them.  
 
Fig. 7. Protest against mining along the New Zealand/Aotearoa coast, Auckland, 2010. 
 
Māori struggles to uphold their long-term relationships with water link with 
international, pan-indigenous efforts to critique the values and practices of the societies 
that now dominate decision-making in shared material environments. Their resistance 
resonates with that of other subaltern groups concerned about equity and justice 
between human groups, and between humans and other species. For such counter-
movements in New Zealand, Māori activism is seen less as a threat to public access and 
more as model of collective and sustainable lifeways. In this respect, their relatively 
powerful bi-cultural position and their resistance to water privatization can be seen as a 
last bastion against the rule of the market. But as recent events illustrate, the tide is 
now running against subaltern bioethical positions: whether suborned by neo-liberal 
values, or losing out in the courts, this bastion is crumbling. Processes of enclosing water 
and appropriating a ‘common good’ continue in New Zealand and elsewhere.  
 
Previous academic research has focused mostly on the legal issues in relation to 
property, or on ecological issues relating to sustainability. There is a need for more 
interdisciplinary research that considers the ways that particular bioethical stances 
cohere with specific cultural values and practices and their manifestation in law. Though 
simmering discontents internationally have produced some ‘joined up’ talk about 
degrowth economics, social and ecological justice and the need to reaffirm and expand 
ideas about the common good, these voices have been largely drowned out by anxieties 
about economic collapse and by the dogged commitment of powerful groups to 
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maintaining ‘business as usual’. And it appears that ‘business as usual’ entails further 
measures to appropriate, commodify and privatize water.  
 
_____________________________________________ 
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